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Strengthening the Passivity Default
Ian Ayres*
Edward Fox**
In The Prudence of Passivity, Bryon Harmon and Laura Fisher
(hereafter HF) argue that "passive management become the default ap-
proach for the investment of trust funds, to be abandoned only when
circumstances specifically dictate the use of active management."' In
this comment we argue that their thesis could be strengthened (i) by
more clearly distinguishing between default law and default investment
practices, (ii) by more clearly articulating their favored altering rules.
I. A CLEAR LEGAL DEFAULT
At times, HF use the term "default" to merely mean "standard" or
"normal" as in their claim: "Traditionally, most trustees, like most inves-
tors generally, also seemingly view a conventional active management
approach as the default approach (or even the exclusive approach) to
investing trust funds."2 But for legal scholars, the more relevant ques-
tion is whether trust law imposes a default duty on trustees to invest
passively. A default legal duty would bind trustees unless the default
was displaced - which entails an analysis of trust law's altering rules.3
HF at other times seem to be using "default" to mean something
close to a default legal duty. For example, when they assert, "[A]s a
default approach, passive investing is more likely to meet a trustee's
core duties: the duties of loyalty and prudence and their derivative obli-
gations to administer the trust solely in the interests of the beneficiaries
and to minimize costs and expenses."4
* William K. Townsend Professor, Yale Law School.
** Assistant Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School.
1 Bryon W. Harmon & Laura A. Fisher, The Prudence of Passivity: An Argument
for Default Passive Management in Trust Investing, 44 ACTEC LJ. 147 (2019).
2 Id. at 150; similarly see id. at 148.
3 Ian Ayres, Regulating Opt-Out: An Economic Theory of Altering Rules, 121 YALE
L.J. 2032 (2011).
4 Harmon & Fisher, supra note 1, at 150; see also id. at 168 ("A default rule in favor
of a passive investment approach will increase the likelihood that most trustees will




This lack of clarity is perhaps emblematic of the state of trust law
on this question. We have argued elsewhere5 that the trustee's fiduciary
duties should be read together to create a default duty not to invest
actively, unless she separately calculates the costs of this strategy in
terms of added risk and fees and reasonably concludes that investing
actively will produce sufficient excess returns (or "alpha") to justify
these additional costs. Our reading of the law accords with the Restate-
ment (Third's) approach, whose official comments state,
If the extra costs and risks of an [active] investment program
are substantial, these added costs and risks must be justified by
realistically evaluated return expectations . . . . [The] gains
from the course of action .. . [must] reasonably be expected to
compensate for its additional costs and risks.6
Under this reading of trust law, HF would be reiterating that the Re-
statement's current legal default is optimal. But as we have pointed out,
the Restatement's presumption against active investing has not been
adopted by courts in litigation. We found that "no court appears to have
quoted or cited this comment since it was published in 1992." '
So a first way to improve the passivity default is to have more ex-
plicit judicial and statutory recognition that it exists. HF say that "pas-
sive investing is more likely to meet a trustee's core duties ... of loyalty
and prudence,"8 but it would be useful for the law to more clearly recog-
nize that active investing presumptively fails to meet a trustee's duty of
prudence. A clear statement of a default duty of passive investing could
take a form parallel to the trustee's duty under the UPIA to diversify
"unless the trustee reasonably determines that, because of special cir-
cumstances, the purposes of the trust are better served without
diversifying." 9
II. CLEARER ALTERING RULES
The beauty of legal default rules is that they do not restrict freedom
of contract. A settlor under a no-active investment default would still be
5 Ian Ayres & Edward Fox, Alpha Duties: The Search for Excess Returns and Ap-
propriate Fiduciary Duties, 97 TEX. L. REV. 445, 496 (2019) (This rule would apply if the
active investment in question would entail substantial costs in terms of under-diversifica-
tion, excess fees, and/or sub-optimal exposure to market risk compared to a passive
baseline.).
6 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 cmt. h(2) (AM. LAW INST. 2007). This
section was initially published in 1992, before much of the rest of the Third Restatement.
7 Ayres & Fox, supra note 5, at 497.
8 Harmon & Fisher, supra note 1, at 150.
9 UNIFORM PRUDENT INVESTOR Acr § 3 (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 1994); see also RE-
STATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90(b).
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free to contract around the default and direct or authorize a trustee to
invest actively.
But default rules necessarily have associated altering rules - the le-
gal rules establishing the necessary and sufficient conditions for displac-
ing or altering a legal default.10 We believe HF would do well to more
explicitly consider these altering rules. The Restatement comment
quoted above already hints at a set of altering rules when it says "these
added costs and risks must be justified by realistically evaluated return
expectations."" This suggests that a trustee must undertake a cost-bene-
fit analysis before displacing the passivity default and investing ac-
tively. 12 In addition, the trustee's existing duty to keep adequate records
would also include contemporaneously recording the reasoning and cal-
culations underlying this cost-benefit analysis.'3
The problem with the Restatement approach is that it doesn't clar-
ify how much expected alpha is necessary to justify the extra fees and
necessary diversification losses of active investment.14 We have at-
tempted to quantitatively estimate the size of the expected alphas re-
quired to offset these costs. We find that an average investor would need
to expect to beat the market each year by 6-15% to entirely forego the
benefits of diversification and invest solely in a single stock.15 In addi-
tion, we find that during times of crisis, trustees need higher expected
10 Ayres, supra note 3, at 2033.
11 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 cmt. h(2).
12 One small quibble that we have with HF's analysis of this section is their claim:
"Logically, therefore, the costs associated with active management are not justified unless
they realistically can be expected to produce returns in excess of their necessarily higher
fees or provide a diversification benefit not otherwise available." Harmon & Fisher,
supra note 1, at 173 (citation omitted). The authors' suggestion that active management
can "provide a diversification benefit not otherwise available" misunderstands both the
Restatement and modem portfolio theory. Active investment necessarily sacrifices diver-
sification, because the process of selecting a subset of investments that one believes will
beat the market entails exposing the portfolio to some idiosyncratic risk. See Ayres &
Fox, supra note 5, at 449, 463-64 ("Actively managed funds ... require some diversifica-
tion sacrifices because the fund managers must pick a limited number of firms that they
believe will outperform the market."). The Restatement approach implicitly reflects this
by requiring trustees to justify taking on both the "extra costs and risk" of active invest-
ment. RESTATEMENT (TmRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 cmt. h(2).
13 As discussed in Ayres & Fox, supra note 5, at 499, many professional fiduciaries
already have investment protocols that require this kind of alpha justification for under-
diversified portfolios with single holdings making up more than 10 or 20% of the trust's
assets.
14 See id. at 497. We observed there that perhaps the failure of courts to cite the
Restatement "is not surprising: before our work [in Alpha Duties] there have been few
attempts to systematically estimate the size of offsetting alphas, and these figures are
needed to make the calculations that the Restatement seems to call for." Id.
15 Id. at 449.
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alpha in order to justify the reduced diversification of active investment,
with alphas rising to 9-18% per year.16 The increased costs of active in-
vestment during times of market upheaval make it especially important
that the reasonableness of active investment, as with other aspects of the
duty to invest prudently, be evaluated "at regular intervals to ensure
that they are [still] appropriate."1 7 Likewise, high fees charged by active
managers must be offset by alphas equal to the excess of those fees
above those charged by passive funds.'8
Any analysis of investing in actively managed mutual funds should
include a consideration of the extent to which the funds are pursuing
"closet index" strategies. Martijn Cremers and Antti Petajisto estimate
that a substantial number of funds claiming to be actively managed per-
sistently achieve returns that correlate strongly with passively managed
funds.'9 Their "active share" measure provides an estimate of what por-
tion of a fund's portfolio is really actively managed from an economic
perspective and this measure is freely available for thousands of mutual
funds.20 Understanding the active share proportion is essential to assess-
ing whether the fund fees are "alpha justified," because a fund that is
charging a 1% annual fee, but only actively invests 50% of its portfolio
is in effect charging close to a 2% annual fee on the actively managed
proportion of its portfolio.21 Cremers and Petajisto find that "funds with
the lowest Active Share have poor benchmark-adjusted returns and al-
phas before expenses (between 0.11% and -0.63%) and do even worse
after expenses, underperforming by -1.42% to -1.83% per year."22
The altering rules discussed above would be sufficient to stamp out
imprudent active investment of trust assets in an ideal world. Trustees
16 Id.
17 Compare Harmon & Fisher, supra note 1, with Tibble v. Edison Int'l, 843 F.3d
1187, 1197 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (citations omitted) (quoting AMY M. HESS, GEORGE
G. BOGERT & GEORGE T. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 684, at
147-48 (3d ed. 2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
18 While HF are correct that a trustee has a duty to minimize fees, we think it makes
more sense to consider the prudence of active management after considering all the costs
of such a strategy together including excess fees, under-diversification, and potentially
taking on the wrong amount of market risk.
19 K.J. Martijn Cremers & Antti Petajisto, How Active is Your Fund Manager? A
New Measure that Predicts Performance, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 3329 (2009).
20 AcrvESHARE, https://activeshare.info/ (last visited May 31, 2019).
21 For example, the authors estimate that the fee on the active portion of the Fidel-
ity Advisor Dividend Growth Fund is 1.67% even though its expense ratio is just 1%,
because it is estimated to actively invest just 60% of its portfolio. Fidelity Advisor Series I:
Fidelity Advisor Dividend Growth Fund, AcrlVESHARE, https://activeshare.info/fund/fi-
delity-advisor-series-i-fidelity-advisor-dividend-growth-fund (last visited May 31, 2019).
22 Cremers & Petajisto, supra note 19, at 3329. See also Sam Mamudi, What Are You




would only invest actively if the excess returns outweigh the costs of
using such a strategy. In fact, there are a variety of reasons why we
might expect this perfect deterrence to go awry. For example, settlors
and trustees may lack sufficient knowledge about the costs and benefits
of active investment to make fully informed choices. Moreover, the dif-
ficulty of evaluating such decisions ex post may provide cover for unin-
formed or even conflicted decisions by the trustee to invest actively. As
a result, courts or legislators may wish to add procedural requirements
to the altering rules to make them more effective.
Courts might establish a "cautionary" altering rule, mandating that
to be effective, a trust instrument opting out of the default duty to invest
passively must indicate that the settlor has been apprised of and under-
stands the alpha tradeoff relevant to active investment and possibly the
initial estimates of expected costs (fees and diversification losses) and
benefits (expected alpha) of active investment. At a minimum, the trus-
tee could disclose the expected alpha required to offset fees and diversi-
fication losses during crisis and non-crisis periods.23
Trust law might go further and require settlors to pass a sophistica-
tion test before authorizing trustees to eschew passive investing. We sug-
gested a similar prerequisite concerning non-diversified ERISA
investments:
This testing requirement is an example of an altering rule that
"reduces the likelihood of error by requiring individuals to
demonstrate actual knowledge of the issues related to opt out
before they can deviate from the status quo."24 Train and test
altering has been deployed in other high-stakes settings (such
as student loans and human-subjects approval) and has been
recommended for testing securities sophistication.25
Settlors who demonstrate by passing the test that they are aware of
the kinds of tradeoffs entailed by active investing would be free to have
their trustees seek alpha in ways that exposed the trust beneficiaries to
some mixture of diversification, exposure, or excess-fee losses. But this
procedural altering rule pre-requisite would beneficially impede many
settlors from ill-advisedly agreeing to active trust investment.26
In addition to testing for settlor sophistication, it might be worth-
while to only allow active investing by trustees who are able to pass a
23 See Ayres & Fox, supra note 5, at 494.
24 Ian Ayres & Quinn Curtis, Beyond Diversification: The Pervasive Problern of Ex-
cessive Fees and "Dominated Funds" in 401(k) Plans, 124 YALE L.J. 1476, 1525 (2015).
25 Ayres & Fox, supra note 5, at 513-14 (some citations omitted).
26 The possibility of a sophistication test is also explored by Ayres and Curtis in
Beyond Diversification, supra note 24, at 1525, albeit without testing participants' knowl-
edge of alpha tradeoffs.
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test concerning alpha tradeoffs.27 Just as there are licensing tests for
both broker-dealers and investment advisers, we might require trustees
who invest actively to demonstrate some enhanced financial acumen.
FINRA currently requires both broker-dealers and investment advisers
to pass exams that include sections covering the suitability requirement,
which is akin to the duty of prudent investment.28 But the questions on
these exams fail to test applicants on whether failures to diversify or
take appropriate levels of risk or to minimize investment fees can be
justified by expectations of excess returns. Trust testing could assure that
trustees have both a theoretical and empirical understanding about the
central tradeoffs entailed in active management. For example, they
should not only know theoretically that some alpha is required before
sacrificing the benefits of diversification (and that it tends to increase
during crisis periods), but they should also know empirically what order
of magnitude this alpha must be for beneficiaries of different levels of
risk aversion. They should be tested on what alpha is required before
taking on too much or too little market risk. And, most simply, they
should know that any superficially excessive fees on an actively man-
aged mutual fund must be justified by even higher alpha expectations.
Last, the altering rules should be sensitive to conflicts of interest.
HF argue conflicts of interest are a main reason why active management
persist in trusts.29 Their concern about conflicts makes sense in general.
Conflicts of interest seem to drive many of the worst decisions to invest
actively. For example, brokers often recommend retail investors choose
actively managed mutual funds which underperform but pay the brokers
high commissions.30 This costs retail investors billions of dollars a
year.3 1
27 Ayres & Fox, supra note 5, at 510 make an analogous proposal regarding en-
hanced testing of brokers-dealers and investment advisers.
28 See id. Before recommending transactions involving stocks, bonds, and a variety
of other securities, broker-dealers must, inter alia, pass a 6-hour Series 7 exam. Series 7:
General Securities Representative Exam, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AuTH., http://
www.finra.org/industry/series7 (last visited May 31, 2019). Conversely, investment adviser
representatives must pass a 3-hour Series 65 exam. Series 65: Uniform Investment Adviser
Law Exam, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AuTH., http://www.finra.org/industry/series65 (last
visited May 31, 2019). See Michael Kitces, Are the Licensing and Other Requirements to
Become a Financial Advisor Too Easy?, KITCES (Aug. 24, 2015), https://www.kitces.com/
blog/are-the-licensing-and-other-requirements-to-become-a-financial-advisor-too-easy/
for the License Requirements.
29 Harmon & Fisher, supra note 1, at 173-76.
30 See Ayres & Fox, supra note 5, at 452, 503.
31 The Council of Economic Advisers concluded that brokers' conflicted promotion
of actively managed funds cost retirement savers alone $17 billion per year. See COUNCIL
OF ECON. ADVISERS, TI-IE EFFECTS OF CONFICTED INVESTMENT ADVICE ON RETIRE-
MENT SAVINGs 10-11, 13 tbl.4 (2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/
files/docs/cea-coi-report-final.pdf. Indeed, there is evidence that broker-sold mutual
[Vol. 44:289294
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Trustees, in contrast with brokers, are subject to a strict duty of
loyalty. In addition, many trustees are compensated on a fixed percent-
age of the trust assets, which will usually align the trustee's incentives
with beneficiaries in terms of not paying excess fees to outside manag-
ers. HF argue nevertheless that corporate and professional trustees may
still be incentivized to manage actively to benefit "their sales and mar-
keting departments."3 2 To the extent that these arrangements do not
violate the duty of loyalty, the test for determining whether the passivity
default has been reasonably displaced should factor in this conflict. For
example a trustee who-after analyzing the costs and benefits-chooses
to invest with an actively managed mutual fund run by the trustee's sub-
sidiary would be scrutinized more carefully than if the trustee chose an-
other actively managed fund with similar fees and risks but from which
the trustee could not in any way benefit.
III. CONCLUSION
HF have a worthy target. There is undoubtedly excessive active in-
vesting of trust assets. Enlightened strengthening of a passive investing
default together with well-designed altering rules can preserve contrac-
tual freedom while channeling assets toward lower fees and better diver-
sified investments.
funds account for the bulk of the under-performance of actively managed mutual funds.
See Diane Del Guercio & Jonathan Reuter, Mutual Fund Performance and the Incentive
to Generate Alpha, 69 J. FIN. 1673 (2014) (finding broker-sold funds substantially un-
derperform but that actively managed funds sold directly to investors do not under per-
form passive indices).
32 It would be useful for HF to be a bit more specific about the types of compensa-
tion arrangements which they believe are most problematic. They seem to be referring to
trustees' ability in most states to invest trust assets in mutual funds operated by the trus-
tee or an affiliate or to take reasonable management fees directly from the trust corpus.
Harmon & Fisher, supra note 1, at 152 n.17. Cf JESSE DUKEMINIER & ROBERT H.
SicoiFF, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 593 (Wolters Kluwer Law & Bus., 9th ed. 2013).
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